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Abstract: This work introduces the design and imple-
mentation of an Android-based Peer-to-peer Purchase
and Rental Application termed PuRSCA, which leverages
Smart Contracts (SC) and the Ethereum public blockchain
(BC). As a Device-to-device (D2D) communication proto-
col, WiFi-Direct is chosen to enable the P2P data trans-
mission between two parties. This work results in a cost-
efficient, secure, SC-based, P2P, and Decentralized appli-
cation (Dapp). Evaluations on performance of this Dapp
is specified in terms of its D2D deployment, transaction
costs, scalability, security, and privacy.
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1 Introduction
In the last decade, Business-to-Consumer (B2C) platforms
dominated e-commerce business. With the introduction
of initial Consumer-to-Consumer (C2C) platforms, a new
form of markets emerged where private persons can come
together and exchange goods and services directly [20].
The phenomenon of the rapid growth of the C2C market in
the last years is often referred to as the “Sharing Economy”
[20] with uses cases such as car and home rental [1, 23].
As of today, concluding an electronic (online) pur-
chase contract between two parties requires centralized
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platforms to mediate the interests of seller and buyer.
These platforms have to store the description of purchased
items and their price, and customers can interact with
such a platform to buy any item such as in ebay [12]. Online
purchasing also requires centralized platforms, like banks
or credit card institutes, to enable and operate safe and
valid payments. Theproblem that all these platforms share
is that they rely on a Trusted Third Party (TTP), the plat-
form owner, to operate the platform. This results in many
disadvantages for consumers. Theyneed to register at each
platform separately and typically have to give away their
private data to the platform owners. Customers often have
to pay transaction fees [5]. A TTP also determines a single
point of failure for the platform, since (a) can be shut down
due to platform owner not wanting to comply with a cen-
tral (legal) authority or (b) it can be attacked.
A solution to overcome is central requirement of a TTP
in a contractual agreement between two or more parties
is offered by Smart Contracts (SC). The concept of SC was
first introduced by [26] as a digital protocol that facilitat-
ing an agreement process between different parties with-
out any intermediary by enforcing certain predefined rules
that embed contractual clauses, like property rights, di-
rectly into hard- and software to make it expensive for a
party to breach the protocol.
[26] outlines a hypothetical digital security system for
cars, where a cryptographic key represents the ownership
of that car and the cryptographic key is only transferred,
if the terms implemented within the protocol are fulfilled.
In this example, the owner of a car can withdraw the key
from a leaser, who does not pay the monthly rent. At that
time, SCs were not practically achievable, since no digital
infrastructure existed that allowed the secure execution of
such protocols without a TTP. This changedwith the intro-
duction of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin [4] and its underly-
ing Blockchain (BC) technology.
The Ethereum BC [14] was introduced with a fully
decentralized architecture that provides the potential in
solving problems of centralized applications without a
TTP. Ethereum enables development of Decentralized ap-
plications (Dapp) using SCs. Several scripting languages
are supported by Ethereum, such as Solidity, a contract-
oriented high level language whose syntax is similar to
JavaScript (JS). Various types of apps can be implemented
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in Solidity, like voting, crowd funding, blind auctions or
multi signature wallets [15].
To tackle the problem of an intermediary as with tra-
ditional contracts, such as the need for a TTP and time
consuming paperwork to reach a legally valid documen-
tation (e. g., description of traded objects and identities),
this work here proposes the design and implementation
of a Dapp to replace the centralized TTP-based solutions
for purchase and rental contracts. This Dapp is developed
for Android-based mobile phones with a P2P architecture
which employs the Ethereum BC as its decentralized back-
end architecture. It addresses major challenges of a Dapp
such as choosing the best protocol for Device-to-device
(D2D) communications, providing trust, privacy, and secu-
rity, developing SC code to be as cost efficient as possible
with a high degree of scalability and an ability of handling
and managing transactions for setting up successful con-
tracts.
A critical aspect in developing apps using SCs, is the
cost for persisting transactions in the BC. To overcome
PuRSCA high costs of storing data, this paper introduces
lightweight contracts along with full contracts. Further
more, data types in the SC developed are selected carefully
regarding units to result in the least possible cost. Also,
a quantitative analysis was carefully followed to calculate
SC deployment estimates in advance with a high degree of
accuracy [30].
PuRSCA is based on a generic solution designed to
cover a great area of trading objects. Users of this system,
will be able to use this application while both parties of
a contract have the application installed on their mobile
phones and connected to the Ethereum BC.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews
related work. While legal aspects of purchase contracts
are described in Section 3 and legal validity of SCs are ex-
plained, too. A brief overview of theWiFi-Direct communi-
cation protocol is provided in Section 4.Major design deci-
sions are presented in Section 5, and the implementation
of the system, including SCs andD2D connections, are dis-
cussed in detail in Section 6. Section 7, presents cost evalu-
ations of the implemented SCs including empirical results
and the analysis of privacy and security. Finally, conclu-
sions and future work are provided within Section 8.
2 Related work
An investigation of existing apps reveals that only a few,
such as Bogner’s app [5], TransActive Grid [27], and Digix
[11], exploit BCs and SCs to develop mobile apps with the
purpose of a flexible (in terms of information from both
parties to be presented to each other and accessing fur-
ther parties information by D2D communications), legally
valid, and safe transaction execution (guaranteed pur-
chasing and renting transactions) for the purchase and
renting use case.
An application presented in [5] employs SCs and the
Ethereum BC for the conclusion of rental contracts. In this
app, the creator of a contract can register rental objects
that are stored in a dictionary and referenced by their IDs.
SCs store the description of the item togetherwith its rental
price and deposit. When one party wants to rent an ob-
ject, he/she scans its QR (quick Response) code with the
camera of her smart phone. In Bogner’s solution [5] a cen-
tral SC is used to manage existing items that can be only
rented by focusing on the commercial renting of items
from a store. A draw back of such a centralized SC is that
for registering each object, the owner has to pay a consid-
erable amount ofmoney for transaction fees to add the ob-
ject’s information into the public Ethereum BC. Bogner’s
App does not consider the renters’ privacy. However, the
Dapp focuses on direct transactions between two parties
and also purchase contracts and supports the exchange of
personal information between participants adjustably.
TransActive Grid is a not fully decentralized P2P en-
ergy trading platform that uses Ethereum-based SCs to
manage transactions between participants in a local elec-
tric power microgrid [27]. Every owner of a “photovoltaic”
facility installs a smart meter that keeps track of the sur-
pluses he/she makes. The smart meter then updates the
available surplus for this participant on an SC on the
Ethereum BC. Interested buyers that living in the same
neighbourhood can then interact with the contract to buy
energy credits.
The Brooklyn microgrid [6] is the first renewable en-
ergy startup that uses the TransActiveGrid system to create
a local energy market. This system is not yet fully decen-
tralized because it relies on the payment platform Paypal
to conduct the financial transactions. However, it is dedi-
cated to the application of trading SCs, a specific use case
which is not usable for replacing traditional trading con-
tracts.
Digix is an asset tokenisation service built on the
Ethereum BC. Digix is offering physical gold bullions on
the BC, more specifically, digital tokens (DGX tokens)
linked to real world physical assets. DGX tokens are cre-
ated (“minted”) through an Ethereum SC with each token
representing 1 gram of gold. Each DGX token can be linked
definitely to a Proof of Asset (PoA) card of a physical gold
bar. The PoA card is storedwithin an SC on the BC and con-
tains information like the time stamp of the card creation,
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Table 1: Comparison of Related Apps.
BC Technology Used Application Use case Payment method Client Platform Fully Decentralized
Bogner Dapp Ethereum P2P rental contracts Ether Mobile No
Transactive Grid Ethereum P2P energy trading Paypal Desktop No
Digix Ethereum Physical asset tokenization Gold and other metals Desktop No
PuRSCA Ethereum P2P rental and purchase contracts Ether Mobile Yes
the gold bar serial number, the purchase receipt, and the
audit documentation [10].
The PoA asset card is created through the Asset Reg-
istration Process. This process accepts a gold contract
from a user and creates the PoA card that is linked to the
Ethereum address of the user. To convert the PoA asset
card to DGX tokens, a user can use the Minter SC that will
hold the PoA card and return 1DGX tokenper gramof gold.
With the Recaster SC a user can exchange its DGX tokens
back into PoA cards. To redeem the PoA card back to the
physical gold bar, the user can trigger the Redemption Pro-
cess [10].
The main benefit of DGX tokens is that their value
is more stable than the cryptocurrency Ether (ETH), be-
cause they are directly backed by gold or other physical
assets. Another benefit ofDGXcompared to traditional dig-
ital gold certificates is that this system does not rely on a
centralized database that holds the information stored in
a PoA card. Further, the related app is prone to “Man In
The Middle” (MITM) attacks because users use a desktop
client to log in, instead of a Web form [10].
A comparative overview of related apps is listed in
Table 1. In this table, PuRSCA (Decentralized Purchase
and Rental Contract Application) is the solution presented
in this article. All apps in this table are developed in
the Ethereum BC. Considering the use case and currency,
the Bogner app [5] which is a Dapp designed for rental
contracts is the closest implementation to the solution
proposed in this work. Considering the client platforms,
Transaction Grid [27] andDigix [11] are developed for desk-
top machines, while Bogner and SC Dapps are specifically
designed for Mobile phones and considering decentraliza-
tion. PuRSCA is capable of being fully decentralizedby em-
ploying Ethereum light clients on the smart phones.
3 Legal aspects of purchase and
rental contracts
Since legal aspects of purchase and rental contracts and
their requirements need to be met to provide to users
legally bonding contracts, a purchase contract should not
only be accepted by law, but also be enforceable by law.
This poses the question on properties required a purchase
contract must have to offer a legally valid basis.
Lawdoes not give a definition of a “purchase contract”
but describes duties of the involved parties resulting from
the conclusion of a purchase contract: The seller has to
hand out the purchase item and to transfer the property
of it to the buyer and it obligates the buyer has to pay the
purchase price to the seller [8]. He/she also must accept
the item that is offered to him in the purchase contract. If
nothing else is negotiated or commonly accepted, the de-
livery and reception of an item must take place immedi-
ately. Finally, the buyer has to review the purchase item
after reception and has to notify the seller about possible
defects [27].
Conclusion of a purchase contract needs general rules
on contract conclusionswhich in this casewe consider the
swiss federal law defined inOR 1 ff [25] have to be applied.
The most important rules are briefly described here:
– Conformable will: It is crucial that both parties ex-
press their will to conclude the contract. It is alsomen-
tioned that this declaration can be explicit or implicit.
This means that the relationship between the parties
may be created orally, in writing or by conduct. For
example, when a party accepts a good or a service
for payment, this is considered a declaration of intent
by conduct [7]. However, an offer in an online-shop is
usually not considered an offer in legal terms, but an
offer to the customer to send a bid to the seller. This
means that the offer is made, when a customer orders
a good or a service. The seller has to accept this offer
for a contract to be formed. He/she can accept this of-
fer either explicitly or implicitly by sending the goods
to the customer [22]. Alternatively, [7] says that the ap-
plicant of an offer is not legally bound to it, if he/she
adds a disclaimer of warranty to the offer or if such a
caveat lies in nature or in the circumstances of an offer
[24].
– Requirements for Validity: The purchase contract
has to fulfill specific formal requirements for spe-
cial kinds of contracts (for example when buying real
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Table 2: Overview of wireless technologies in D2D communications.
Bluetooth BLE 4.0 WiFi-Direct NFC
IEEE Standard 802.15.1 802.15.1 802.11 (a, b, g, n) ISO 18092
Frequency (GHz) 2.4 2.4 2.4 and 5.0 0.01356
Max. Data Rate (Mbps) 1–3 (24 with HS) 1 11 (b), 54(g), 600 (n) 0.106, 0.212 or 0.424
Security 128 bit SAFER+ 128 bit AES, user
defined on app layer
256 bits AES-CCMP short range, user
defined on app layer
estate). Furthermore, the purchase contract has to
conform to the barriers of contractual freedom. This
means that the content of the contract can be chosen
freely unless it violates the law or it is an agreement
against public policy [27].
– Articles of Agreement: For the conclusion of a con-
tract the parties need to agree at least on the essen-
tial articles of the agreement (Essentialia Negotii). For
a purchase contract, both parties must agree on the
price and the purchase item for the contract to be valid
[8].
3.1 Legal validity of SC-based applications
A crucial aspect about SC-based apps while comparing
to regular contracts is whether these contracts are legally
valid or they need to adopt to some specific rules. The na-
ture of offers in SCs are very different from an offer in an
online shop. In a conventional online shop, sellers do not
have to accept an offer from customers, and buyers only
have to pay the purchase price if sellers confirmed the pur-
chase. In contrast, SCs allows only one buyer per offer and
account of the buyer is immediately charged after clicking
on the “Buy” button. Furthermore, the SC is locked after
the payment of the buyer is confirmed and neither party
can withdraw the money any more.
It can be argued that such an offer is binding by na-
ture, because the SC does not allow for the withdrawal of
a payment after an offer is accepted by the buyer. To make
sure that an offer made by seller is binding, it is better to
specify this explicitly in the general terms and conditions
of the app. For example, general terms and conditions of
“Ebay” also specify these conditions for offers made by
their customers [13].
Articles of an agreement are fulfilled, if the price and
the purchase item are defined properly. Since the SC re-
quires the seller to specify the price in a common currency,
the first condition is satisfied. Regarding the definition of
the purchase item, the law does not specify in which form
and how detailed this description must be. Therefore, it
has been assumed that a written description of a purchase
item and its properties together with one or more pictures
of it are considered sufficient.
Regarding formal requirements, it can be stated that
every SC is valid as long as its content does not require this
contract to fulfill special formal properties. This means
that for example contracts involving the purchase of real
estate, patents, designs, or trade markets cannot be con-
cluded with the SCs developed within PuRSCA.
Considering the above mentioned requirements, the
implemented PuRSCA approach is legally valid, since the
following conditions are fulfilled: (1) General terms and
conditions explicitly state that an offer made by the seller
is binding by law. (2) Content of the SC does not violate
the law and is not an agreement against public policy. (3)
The content of the SC does not have special formal require-
ments by law.
4 Device-to-device communication
In order to provide the means of sending and receiv-
ing the contract description, identity data, and images
of objects, owners, and costumers, there are few proto-
cols to choose such as, Near Field Communication (NFC),
WiFi, WiFi-Direct, Bluetooth, and Bluetooth Low Energy
(BLE).
Wireless technologies may differ in various dimen-
sions such as operating frequency range, data rate, secu-
rity standards, and ease of utilization. Intuitively, the best
protocol selection depends on the requirements and use
cases. In PuRSCA, the most important factors for selecting
a D2D protocol can be classified as high data rate, security,
and ease of use. A brief overview of D2D communication
protocols are listed in Table 2 and a comprehensive com-
parison is done by authors in [31].
WiFi-Direct is an extension of the IEEE 802.11 proto-
col and it is developed for direct communication of two or
more devices in the absence of a distribution network. In-
stead of building on top of the 802.11 ad-hoc mode, which
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was never widely adopted and lacks efficient power sav-
ing support and extended QoS capabilities, it extends the
infrastructure mode and allows the devices negotiate for
the role of the Access Point. WiFi-Direct inherits all the en-
hanced QoS, power saving, and security mechanisms of
the infrastructure mode [31].
WiFi-Direct uses the WiFi Protected Setup (WPS) pro-
cedure to secure the connection with minimal user in-
tervention. WPS is based on the WiFi Protected Access
2 (WPA2) protocol. WPA2 implements the IEEE 802.11i
standard and provides data confidentiality and integrity
by using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)-CCMP
cypher. When used in Personal mode, a Pre-Shared-Key
(PSK) must be present both at the AP and the client for the
mutual authentication. The 256 bit PSK is usually gener-
ated from a plain text pass phrase that must be entered on
both devices. After the authentication, a set of temporary
keys is exchanged between the AP and the clientwhich are
regularly updated [28]. WPA2 is considered secure against
most attacks like man-in-the-middle (MITM), authentica-
tion forging, replay, key collision, weak keys, packet forg-
ing, and brute force attacks [3].
Considering throughput, since both the user profile
and the contract can contain high resolution images, the
payload can easily exceed 1 MByte. Both classic Bluetooth
and BLE do not provide the required bandwidth for trans-
mitting larger files in a reasonable time, especially since
the achievable data rates will be below the theoretical
limit. Bluetooth 3.0+HS could provide up to 24 Mbps, but
it has not been widely used among smart phone users as
well as NFCwhich usually users don’t knowhow to run the
NFC or they can’t find the exact location of the NFC hard-
ware in their cellphones. Therefore,WiFi-Direct is selected
as it can be easily used and provides the required through-
put.
Even thoughWiFi-Direct uses 256 bit key length for en-
cryption, it is still vulnerable against Man-In-The-Middle
(MITM) attacks during theWPS authentication procedure.
While, both Bluetooth and BLE offer OOB and PIN authen-
tication, to exchange keys [19, 21]. Considering related se-
curity issues of user profile, which contains personal in-
formation, the data transmission should be encrypted ap-
propriately. Although the exchanged data is personal and
allows a potential adversary to identify the parties, it does
not provide her with information (i. e., user’s Secret key
(SK)) that could be used to steal money out of a contract or
to sign a contract. Even if both parties could sign a contract
with a certified signature in future, the SK would never be
transmitted to the other device. Therefore, security is cer-
tainly important but it does not have the same priority as
data throughput has in this use case.
5 Design
Based on the discussion in previous sections, some of the
most important factors of designing PuRSCA can be spec-
ified as, automating the processes for data and money
transactions, ensuring both partieswith guaranteed trans-
actions, identity verification, reliable decentralized data
storage, trust to the Dapp and its underlying technologies,
fast and secure P2P and D2D communications, and high
user privacy.
PuRSCA is designed to operate and to be used as a BC-
based system. Within this system, each two parties of a
contract are able to setup contracts in a trustable P2P sys-
tem, even though there is no direct trust between them.
This feature derived by the public Ethereum BC nature.
General architecture PuRSCA is designed with two
main utilizationmethods. In the firstmethod, the users in-
stall Ethereum light client on their smart phones and thus,
they are connecteddirectly to theEthereumBCas shown in
the right side of the Figure 1. In the second method, users
need to connect to an Ethereum client which may be in-
stalled on a their personal laptop, as shown in the left side
of the Figure 1.
Figure 1: General System’s Architecture – Users can connect to BC
via full clients or via light clients.
Identity provision as one of the key aspects of this
Dapp is designed to be possible in two methods. The first
method is using QR code readers in which each party can
read the other party’s identity by reading his/her QR code
image. Secondmethod is to send and receive identity data
via a D2D connection.
General design of this system is meant to provide flex-
ibility in choosing ID information to be sent to the other
side of contract. Being flexible is determined here as what
users experience while setting up contracts. In PuRSCA,
users are not forced to provide any documents and they
can negotiate with each other (here bilaterally only, as
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discussed above) and send to each other, e. g., ID infor-
mation off-chain. With such an option of flexibly adapt-
ing to current contractual needs, users are able to insert
the least possible amount of their ID information. Even
though users have already entered all those information
(e. g., 1: QR code and 2: image) in their profile, they can
simply choose what to send and what to preserve from be-
ing sent.
Another important design decision in this system is
to establish trust for both sides of contracts. In PuRSCA,
parties of a contract have to deposit the same amount
of money in terms of Ether to avoid any malicious be-
haviour.
5.1 System utilization
To use PuRSCA, users have to install the application and
obtain a Public Key (PK) and Secret Key (SK) from the
Ethereum BC. Sequence diagram of purchasing process is
shown in Figure 2. In the trading process, the seller creates
contracts and has to pay a deposit. Next, he/she sends the
contract information to buyer and provides his/her ID in-
formation consecutively. The buyer has to send his/her ID
to seller in return and execute the buying function. After
the sold object is delivered to the buyer, he/she confirms
reception of that object. In the next step, the deposited
amount will be sent back to both parties and the seller re-
ceives the price for the sold object.
Figure 2: Designed Purchase Sequence Diagram In The Proposed
System.
In the renting use case, PuRSCA designed to ask the
hierer to execute the reclaim function after he/she received
back the rented object from renter (cf. Figure 3). In the next
step, renting price is calculated by the rental-SC and renter
executes the return function to pay the rent price. Finally
the deposited amount by two parties will be sent back to
each of them (cf. Figure 4).
Figure 3: Designed Renting Sequence Diagram In The Proposed
System.
6 Implementation of the P2P
solution
Implementation of PuRSCA includes developing the pur-
chase and rental SCs, Android application, D2D commu-
nications, installing Ethereumclients, and eventually con-
necting all parts together.
6.1 Rental and purchase smart contracts
Purchase and rental contracts are based on the “Simple
Trading Contract” presented in Solidity official documen-
tations [15]. Users can setup purchase or rental contracts
with the Android client by creating new contracts or, us-
ing already existing ones. In the purchase SC, to conduct
a safe purchase both seller and buyer have to pay a de-
posit before transaction can take place and deposited as-
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sets are only released when the buyer confirms reception
of the item.
In the rental SC, on one side hirer can specify renting
and deposit fees for an item. On the other side, renter has
to pay the deposit beforehand and only gets it back after
he/she returned the item and paid the renting fee.
In each contract, description of an item is composed
of a title, textual description, and an array of image sig-
natures. An image signature is calculated by using the
SHA256 cryptographic hash function of the images taken
by the Android client. The reason for not storing a whole
image in the Ethereum BC is the cost associated with the
high storage usage. Assuming that a PNG or JPG image
with reasonable resolution has a size of 300 KByte, and
cost of storing one 256 bit word on the Ethereum BC is
20,000 units of gas, cost for storing one image can be cal-
culated by:
Pstorage = 937.5 × 20000 × Pgas × Pwei (1)
Where Pstorage is the price for storing the image in
USD, Pgas is the gas price and Pwei is the dollar exchange
rate for 1 wei. Absolute price can vary because both gas
price and exchange rate for Ether have a high volatility. As
of July 16, 2017, the average gas price is 4 gwei [15] and the
dollar exchange rate for 1 Ether is approximately 175 $ [8].
Thiswould result in a price of 131.25 $ for storing one single
image!
Every contract also stores address of the 2 contractual
partners as well as price and deposit for the item. The de-
posit is used to ensure contractual compliance of the par-
ties. Finally, contract stores a boolean value that indicates
whether the parties should exchange personal informa-
tion (Listing 1.1 line 2). This indicator is used by client app
todeterminewhether personal information like addresses,
photos or other data should be exchanged between the
parties. Every contract can be aborted in certain circum-
stances and therefore declares the aborted function andan
aborted event (Listing 1.1 lines 7).
6.1.1 Purchase smart contract
Purchase contract is derived from the TradeContract and
it is a modified version of the purchase contract presented
in the official Solidity documentation [15] as shown in List-
ing 1.1.
Listing 1.1: The Purchase Contract
1 con t r a c t Purchase i s TradeContract {
2 func t ion Purchase ( s t r i n g _ t i t l e , s t r i n g
_desc r ip t ion , bool _ve r i f y , by tes32 [ ]
_ imageSignatures ) payable
3 TradeContrac t ( _ t i t l e , _desc r ip t ion , _ve r i f y ,
msg . value / 2 , msg . value / 2 ,
_ imageSignatures ) {
4 i f ( 2 * p r i c e != msg . value ) throw ; }
5 event purchaseConfirmed ( ) ;
6 event i temReceived ( ) ;
7 func t ion abor t ( )
8 on l yS e l l e r
9 i nS t a t e ( S t a t e . Created ) {
10 aborted ( ) ;
1 1 s t a t e = S ta t e . I na c t i v e ;
12 i f ( ! s e l l e r . send ( th is . balance ) ) throw ; }
13 func t ion confirmPurchase ( )
14 i nS t a t e ( S t a t e . Created )
15 r equ i r e (msg . value == 2 * p r i c e )
16 payable {
17 purchaseConfirmed ( ) ;
18 buyer = msg . sender ;
19 s t a t e = S ta t e . Locked ; }
20 func t ion conf i rmReceived ( )
21 onlyBuyer
22 i nS t a t e ( S t a t e . Locked ) {
23 i temReceived ( ) ;
24 s t a t e = S ta t e . I n a c t i v e ;
25 i f ( ! buyer . send ( depos i t ) | | ! s e l l e r . send (
th is . balance ) ) throw ; } }
To give an incentive to a seller to not betray a buyer,
the seller has to transmit Ether in the constructor of the
contract. As can be seen in (Listing 1.1 lines 3–5), the value
provided must be dividable by 2, otherwise the SC throws
an exception. Thus the actual price of the item is only half
the value provided in the constructor (Listing 1.1 line 15).
The deposit is refunded to the buyer and the rest of the bal-
ance stored in the contract is sent back to the seller. Notice
that the state is changed before the Ether is transmitted
with the “send” function (Listing 1.1 lines 11–12). This pre-
vents an attacker from calling the function again from its
fallback function.
When the buyer executes the “confirmPurchase” func-
tion (cf. Listing 1.1 line 17), he/she also has to pay a de-
posit together with the actual purchase price. The state of
the contract is then set to “Locked” (cf. Listing 1.1 line 19).
From this point on, the funds of the 2 parties are locked
and can only be released when the buyer confirms that
he/she received the item (cf. Listing 1.1 line 22). Locking of
deposits makes sure that no party has a monetary advan-
tage in betraying other side since both have invested the
same amount of money in the contract and non of them
can get their deposit back when the other party does not
comply.
As long as the contract is in the state “Created” mean-
ing that buyer has not accepted the offer, seller can execute
the “abort” function and the balance stored in the con-
tract is refunded to him. In the “confirmReceived” function
the buyer confirms that he/she received the item. The state
of the contract is set to “Inactive” meaning that no fur-
ther interaction with it is possible (cf. Listing 1.1 line 24).
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Every time the state of the contract changes, an event is
emitted on the event log. This allows the client app to up-
date its UI and inform the buyer or seller that the state has
changed.
6.1.2 Rental contract
In the rental contract as presented in Listing 1.2, buyer re-
placed by renter and the seller assumed as the role of a
hirer. The hirer defines details of the rent item together
with its renting price and deposit in constructor of the con-
tract (Listing 1.2 line 5). Renting price is provided in wei
per second and the total renting time is calculated (cf. List-
ing 1.2 line 28). As long as the contract is in the “Created
state”, hirer can execute the abort function (cf. Listing 1.2
line 12). When the renter executes the rent function (cf.
Listing 1.2 line 4), he/she has to pay the deposit for the
item. State of the contract is set to Locked and start time for
the contract is initialized. When the renter wants to return
an item, the hirer executes the reclaimItem function (List-
ing 1.2 line 41) which calculates the renting fee based on
the renting time and the price (Listing 1.2 lines 22–29) and
sets the state of the contract to AwaitPayment (Listing 1.2
line 31). In the AwaitPayment state, renter can execute re-
turnItem function, which then returns the deposit and the
change to the buyer. The renting price is sent to the renter.
In the AwaitPayment state, the hirer can also execute the
reclaimItem function again in the case the renter does not
pay in time.
Listing 1.2: The Rental Contract
1 con t r a c t Renting i s TradeContract {
2 u in t256 private rent ingFee ;
3 u in t256 private s t a r t ;
4 func t ion Renting ( s t r i n g _ t i t l e , s t r i n g
_desc r ip t ion , bool _ve r i f y , by tes32 [ ]
_imageSignatures , u in t _deposi t , u in t
_ r en t i ngP r i c e )
5 TradeContrac t ( _ t i t l e , _desc r ip t ion , _ve r i f y ,
_deposi t , _ r en t ingPr i ce , _imageSignatures )
{ }
6 event itemRented ( ) ;
7 event itemReturned ( ) ;
8 event paymentRequested ( ) ;
9 func t ion abor t ( )
10 on l yS e l l e r
1 1 i nS t a t e ( S t a t e . Created ) {
12 aborted ( ) ;
13 s t a t e = S ta t e . I na c t i v e ; }
14 func t ion rent I tem ( )
15 i nS t a t e ( S t a t e . Created )
16 r equ i r e (msg . value == depos i t )
17 payable {
18 s t a r t = now;
19 itemRented ( ) ;
20 buyer = msg . sender ;
21 s t a t e = S ta t e . Locked ; }
22 func t ion ca l cu la teRent ingFee ( )
23 r e tu rns ( u in t256 ) {
24 i f ( s t a t e == S ta t e . I na c t i v e )
25 return rent ingFee ;
26 i f ( s t a r t == 0)
27 return 0;
28 uin t256 rent ingTime = (now − s t a r t ) ;
29 return pr i c e * rent ingTime ; }
30 func t ion re turnI tem ( )
31 i nS t a t e ( S t a t e . AwaitPayment )
32 onlyBuyer
33 r equ i r e (msg . value >= rent ingFee )
34 payable {
35 itemReturned ( ) ;
36 s t a t e = S ta t e . I na c t i v e ;
37 u in t change = rent ingFee − msg . value ;
38 i f ( ! buyer . send ( depos i t + change ) | | !
s e l l e r . send ( th is . balance ) ) throw ; }
40 func t ion again
41 func t ion rec la imItem ( )
42 on l yS e l l e r
43 payable
44 requ i r e ( s t a t e == S ta t e . Locked | | s t a t e ==
S ta t e . AwaitPayment ) {
45 rent ingFee = ca lcu la teRent ingFee ( ) ;
46 paymentRequested ( ) ;
47 s t a t e = S ta t e . AwaitPayment ; } }
6.2 Android application
Some of the most important pages of the PuRSCA are
shown in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4-a illustrates a con-
tract created with the information of a Laptop to be sold.
As shown in this image, picture and description of the
laptop are available. Figure 4-b, illustrates the interface
with which contract information will be sent to the buyer
using WiFi-Direct. In the Fig. 4-c, buyers profile is illus-
trated before sending the contract info to him, the seller
could read these information by reading theQR code of the
buyer’s profile. Figure 4-d, represents a contract’s informa-
tion. In this part, buyer/seller could abort the contract pro-
cess.
As illustrated in the Figure 5-a, users are able to access
their old contracts by choosing the Add existing contract
instead of creating a new contract. Figure 5-b shows a list
of previous contracts made by one client.
In PuRSCA, as a P2P system, Android clients use ser-
vice interfaces of the Java library to load and deploy SC.
The Java Web3j library [29] is used to wrap the interface
of the SCs in Java classes which is then used by the An-
droid client to execute transactions on the BC. Web3j uses
the JSON-RPC interface of an external Ethereum client that
is connected to the Ethereum network to deploy contracts
and interact with them as shown in Figure 6. All SCs in the
proposed Dapp are developed with Solidity language and
their compiled byte-code is stored in the associated Java
wrapper class.
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Figure 4: Process of purchasing a contract, (a) Information of a con-
tract before setting up, (b) Setting up a contract, (c) Buyer identity
information, and (d) Created contract’s information.
6.3 Ethereum client and SC integration
A full Ethereum client on a remote machine is used to in-
tegrate the Android client with the BC. There are several
Ethereum client implementations available. Go-Ethereum
[18], the Google’s Go implementation called Go-Ethereum
(Geth) is used in this Dapp.
To communicate with the Android client form another
process on the same or on anothermachine, the JSON-RPC
protocol is used. Web3j Java library [29] is used to deploy
SC on the BC and to interact with SC from the Android
client. Web3j implements the JSON-RPC interface of the
Ethereum client and provides high-level access to a trans-
action and its content.
Figure 5: (a) UI for Setting Up New Contracts, (b) Accessing Previous
Contracts.
Figure 6: Implementation Architecture Integrating Android and
Ethereum Clients.
7 Evaluations
It is economically important to develop SC-based apps
with the least possible deploying and transaction costs.
For that purpose, first step is to being aware of which pa-
rameters of developed SC affect the total cost of deploying
contracts and sending transactions.
7.1 Costs
In this section, empirical results of deploying SCs are com-
pared to the estimated costs, which are calculated with
introduced cost estimation functions based on the expe-
riences with SCs during the past 3–4 years [32]. Result of
these comparisons indicate the high accuracy of provided
estimation functions. One general outcome of these eval-
uations is the difference between light and full contracts
which obviously light version has less deployment costs
and this explains and proves the incentives of developing
light SC.
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Table 3:Measured Deployment Costs.
cost in gas and in (USD) Empty Contract With One Image (32 Byte) With Two Images (64 Byte) With Three Images (96 Byte)
Purchase Contract 691,023 (3.05) 697,617 (3.08) 719,104 (3.17) 740,591 (3.27)
Rental Contract 760,550 (3.35) 797,144 (3.52) 818,631 (3.61) 840118 (3.70)
Purchase Contract-light 389,702 (1.72) 389,702 (1.72) 389,702 (1.72) 389,702 (1.72)
Rental Contract-light 486,946 (2.15) 486,946 (2.15) 486,946 (2.15) 486,946 (2.15)
Table 4: Estimated Deployment Costs.
cost in gas and in (USD) Empty Contract With One Image (32 Byte) With Two Images (64 Byte) With Three Images (96 Byte)
Purchase Contract 644,800 (2.84) 664,800 (2.93) 684,800 (3.02) 704,800 (3.11)
Rental Contract 737,000 (3.25) 757,000 (3.33) 777,000 (3.43) 797,000 (3.52)
Purchase Contract-light 363,600 (1.60) 363,600 (1.60) 363,600 (1.60) 363,600 (1.60)
Rental Contract-light 454,000 (2.00) 454,000 (2.00) 454,000 (2.00) 454,000 (2.00)
The actual deployment costs in gas for the rental and
purchase SCwere evaluated using the browser Solidity on-
line compiler [15] and the local Ethereum test client. For
the median gas price, a value of 21 gwei (gigawei) was as-
sumed [17]. For the USD exchange rate, the average value
of 210 dollar per “Ether” sinceMay 2017 was taken as a ref-
erence value [16].
According to [15], main costs for deploying a contract
are the costs associated with storing the contract code
(“CREATEDATA”) with cost of 200 gas per byte and the
costs for storing additional data on the storage of the con-
tract (“STORAGEADD”) with 20,000 gas per 256 bit word.
Further, in addition to the 21,000 gas for a normal con-
tract transaction, 32,000 gas have to be paid for a trans-
action that creates a contract [10] concluding in a cost of
21,000+32,000=53,000 gas.
Deployment costs for a contract depend on the size of
the contract code and the amount of bytes that it assigns
to the storage in its constructor. Since both the purchase
and the rental contract do not perform any calculation in-
tensive work in their constructors, their deployment costs
in “Gas” can be estimated using the following formula:
Cgas = (53000 + 200 × Nbytes + 20000 × Nwords) (2)
Where Cgas is the total transaction cost in gas, Nbytes is the
contract size in bytes and Nwords is the number of 256 bit
words that are initialized in the constructor. To calculate
the deployment price in USD, the gas usage has to be mul-
tiplied with the gas price Pgas and the USD exchange rate
for the Ether Pexchange:
Cdollar = Cgas × Pgas × Pexchange10−18 (3)
Table 3 summarizes the measured costs for deploy-
ing the rental and purchase contracts in full and light de-
ploymentmode using different amounts of additional data
(images) to store. As it is shown in this Table, in all the
three tested SCs with different number of images as addi-
tional data to be stored, costs for light contracts are sig-
nificantly lower than full contracts as their source code
use less space. Further, they use less storage by storing
all content attributes (text and images) in a single 32 Byte
hash. Therefore, deployment costs are constant and inde-
pendent of the amount of additional data sent in construc-
tor. Measured values are close to the values estimated by
the simplified Equations 2 and 3 and are shown in Table 4.
The Mean Absolute Percent Error (MAPE) is 5.8%.
7.1.1 Transaction costs
Transaction costs for the purchase and rental contracts are
dominated by the fix transaction costs “GTX” of 21,000
gas, the costs for adding a 256 bit word to the storage
“STORAGEADD” of 20,000 gas, the costs for modifying a
word on the storage “STORAGEMOD” of 5,000 gas and the
costs for making a call from the contract that contains
Ether “GCALLVALUETRANSFER” of 9,000 gas. Other costs
are not significant since no major computation is done in
any of the transaction functions. Therefore, to estimate the
transaction costs, the formula 4 is used which yields to
very good results with the MAPE of only 3.8%.
Cgas = 21000 + 20000 × Nwords_add+ 5000 × Nwords_mod + 9000 × Ntx (4)
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Table 5: Real and Estimated Transaction Costs.
cost in gas and in (USD) Abort Confirm Purchase Confirm Received Rent Item Reclaim Item Return Item
Measured Costs 49,584 (0.22) 62,890 (0.28) 41,657 (0.18) 82,721 (0.36) 41,913 (0.18) 48,146 (0.21)
Estimated Costs 50,000 (0.22) 61,000 (0.27) 44,000 (0.19) 81,000 (0.36) 44,000 (0.19) 45,000 (0.20)
Where Cgas is the total cost in gas,Nwords_add is the number
of 256 bit words added to the storage in the transaction,
Nwords_mod is the number of words that are modified in the
transaction and Ntx is the number of messages with Ether
that are sent in the transaction function (e. g., for refund-
ing Ether to the buyer or seller). The total costs in USD can
be estimated by Equation 3.
Table 4 compares the measured transaction costs for
all transactions of the rent and purchase contracts to the
estimated costs with Equation 4. It was found that a vari-
able is only initialized on the storage when a value differ-
ent from 0 is assigned to it. For example, the state variable
of the contract is only added in the abort or confirmPur-
chase function, when the value changes from the initial
state. This has to be taken into accountwhen using the for-
mula.
7.2 Privacy
This section discusses how privacy issues that arise from
storing and exchanging personal user data are addressed
in the Dapp. It further discusses possible privacy issues
that can rise when storing contract details on the BC and
how they can be avoided.
Privacy of personal user data
In the proposedDapp, all the profile information including
profile images, are stored on internal storage of Android
app to prevent other apps on the device access this data.
However, it doesnot provideprotectionagainst anattacker
that has physical access to a non-encrypted file system or
against an attacker that has root access on the operating
system [2].
Privacy of contracts
Storing contract details in plain text on a SC can cause
privacy issues because the addresses of the seller and the
buyer are also storedon the contract andare thereforepub-
licly accessible. A party that knows a person with a partic-
ular address (e. g., when it exchanged contract or user data
with that person in the past) can look up details of other
contracts that were signed by that person. To prevent that,
the light deployment option can be used.When using light
deployment, only the hash of the details that not meant to
be stored on the BC will be stored in the SC.
7.3 Security
In PuRSCA, accounts can either be managed locally on
the Android device or remotely on the server running the
Ethereumclient.Whenusing theWalletAccountService the
local wallet file is decrypted using the password provided
by the user and the credentials are used by the RawTrans-
actionManager to sign every transaction with the SK be-
longing to that account. WalletAccountService provides
protection against eavesdropping since the wallet pass-
word is never sent to the Ethereum client. It also provides
protection against MITM attacks since a transaction can-
not be altered any more after it has been signed with the
SK. Password for a wallet file is never persisted on the file
system and the SK of an unlocked wallet file is only stored
in volatile memory.
There are only two scenarios left in which an attacker
could obtain or use the SK of an account:
– The attacker has root access on the operating system
and can intercept the password from the user by using
a key logger.
– The attacker has physical access to the phone and
the account is still unlocked. In this case the attacker
could use the account to sign rent or purchase con-
tracts and transmit money to her own account.
Regarding the D2D communication security, asmentioned
in section 4, when user data is exchanged overWiFi-Direct
it is always encrypted using WiFi Protected Setup (WPS).
WPS uses WPA2 to encrypt and authenticate data and
offers good protection against eavesdropping and brute-
force attacks but it is vulnerable againstMITM attacks dur-
ing the short time frame in which the encryption keys are
exchanged [9].
8 Conclusions
Traditionally, setting up purchase or rental contracts be-
tween two parties requires the provisioning of complete
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and accurate identity information of both parties besides
the details of exchanged objects. Hitherto proposals and
apps have followed a centralized approach to ease the
steps required to be taken. However, these apps maintain
the disadvantage of centralized architectures. Most impor-
tant challenges in designing such apps are the P2P com-
munications between parties for transferring contract in-
formation, providing identity information while ensuring
user privacy, legal binding, creating trust in the system,
and data security.
To overcome paper-based preparations for setting
up legally valid purchase and rental contracts between
two parties and to solve contracts handling in central-
ized apps, this paper proposed the Peer-to-Peer Purchase
and Rental Smart Contract-based Application (PuRSCA).
PuRSCA’s goal of satisfying functional and legal require-
ments of an automated purchase and rental contracts
adopted the Ethereum BC. The P2P architecture of this
Dapp enables highly viable data rates in D2D commu-
nications by using WiFi-Direct. In addition to the de-
sign of a full contract, the Dapp introduced light-weight
contracts, which enable the opportunity of transferring
identity information between users without the need
to store them in the public BC and, therefore, reduces
costs.
Furthermore, trust in PuRSCA is provided by design-
ing the deposit-based SC to guarantee seller and buyers
loyalty to contract and money transfer. High privacy pro-
vided by design as this Dapp is completely independent
of any TTP and any seller can specify contract details in-
cluding price, deposit, textual description, and images
to deploy a contract. Contract details can be exchanged
either by scanning a QR-code of the contract or by us-
ing WiFi-Direct. In the latter case, parties can flexibly de-
cide which personal information they want to share. Con-
tracts are signed on the users local device and protected
by storing them only on internal storage and being en-
crypted while sent across the network. PuRSCA is highly
scalable and is capable of handling large numbers of con-
tracts in parallel. Also, it detects network errors and pre-
vents the lose of funds by storing contracts pre-emptively,
when the network fails during contract creation transac-
tions.
Evaluations performed indicate that cost estimations
proposed in this paper are accurate and including the de-
ployment and transactions of SC costs with a high preci-
sion. In turn, these equations indicate as well as a guide-
line on how to implement SCs with least possible costs.
Finally, more inspections with respect to security as-
pects of PuRSCA need to be taken into consideration. The
functionality of PuRSCA can be improved by adopting new
SCs for setting up multi peer contracts. A platform for pro-
viding a supply and demand can be added to the front end
of this system as a reference point for trading, such that in-
formation of available goods can be seen. Of course the im-
plementation of such platform goes beyond PuRSCA and
requires a carefully designed approach to maintain seller
and buyers privacy and their private keys.
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